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1.
GHOST IN THE MACHINE

The scholarly papers contributed to this University of Georgia symposium
on Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner's The Limits of InternationalLaw'
have not hesitated to be sharply critical of the book. The criticisms come from
a wide variety of angles. Andrew Guzman, for example, considers whether
more sophisticated rational choice modeling and game theory might produce
quite different results than the book does, even within its own rational choice
paradigm. 2 Kal Raustiala asks whether the book's conclusions concerning
rational choice theory would change, even within its own paradigm, if it took
into account rational choice theory as applied to American domestic politics
that bear on U.S. international relations.3 Others challenge the book's
empirical and historical claims. David Golove questions the historical basis
of the book's discussion of Civil War era claims about customary international
law in the matter of maritime neutrality.' Allen Buchanan 5 and Margaret
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McGuinness 6 dispute, in different ways, its claims about cosmopolitan, otherregarding behavior and human rights. Peter Spiro challenges a central
assumption in the book that the relevant actor is the "state," as distinguished
from other actors within and outside the state which influence its behavior,
such as nongovernmental organizations, and bureaucratic and other subsets
within the state. Finally, Oona Hathaway and Ariel Lavinbuk, in a separately
published review, question whether there is a necessary connection between
what they see as the book's "rationalist" methodological agenda and its
"revisionist" political agenda. They argue that not only does the former not
imply the latter, but the revisionist political agenda of The Limits of
International Law actually undermines the force of the rationalist
methodology.8
Yet for all the criticism directed toward The Limits of InternationalLaw,
the critiques are all quite accepting of the basic utility of the rationalist method
that underlies it. However badly or incompletely deployed rational choice
theory, game theory, and rationalism may be in Goldsmith and Posner's book,
these methodologies are nonetheless accepted as the coming wave of
international law theory as a new generation of scholars arises, and as
international relations and political science theory gradually become accepted
as systematic methods of explanation in international law. Indeed, Hathaway
and Lavinbuk, in the most elaborate of the critiques, state flatly that the very
problems created by the linkage of Goldsmith and Posner's revisionism to
rationalism "demonstrate[ ] the need for a new rationalist research agenda,
informed by well-developed theory and unburdened by revisionist
commitments."9
This is a telling fact about shifts in international law scholarship, at least
in the United States. Perhaps as telling is the fact that The Limits of
InternationalLaw has not so far been reviewed, so far as I can tell (it is
perhaps still early for law reviews to be on the record), by any of the leading
scholars of the so-called "norm-based" methods of international law that still
predominate in the international legal academy in both the United States and
& COMP. L. 305 (2006).
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Europe. Normative theories of international law, after all, dispute not only
rational choice theory (as this book offers it), but claim something much
stronger that is a fundamental target of The Limits ofInternationalLaw. This
claim is that international law itself exerts a discernible "pull" upon the
behavior of states, as a moral and normative force distinct from anything else.
Normative theories of international law claim for international law (and hence
for its scholars, not merely as scholars but also as actors upon the social system
they both study and strive to move along) a force in international affairs that
is independent of the "mere" interests of states.
Several critiques offered from the symposium indeed support the claim that
state interest is not the only thing acting with some measure of independent
causal force in international affairs. Yet in identifying that force, those
critiques seek by and large to move beyond assertions of the moral force of the
law itself to break down cause and effect into various substate or non-state
actors pursuing their own agendas, moralist and otherwise. It is notably not so
very different from modernity's philosophical agenda to remove definitively
the ghost from the machine. These critiques may reach something like the
same result that traditional norm-based theorists reach by plain appeal to the
independent moral force of international law, but they get there by means that
are very different from those of traditional normative international law with
respect to the account of intentionality and behavior in international law.
Lacking here is either a robust defense of normative approaches to
international law or an attack upon The Limits ofInternationalLaw based upon
the still-dominant Henkin paradigm, the Franck claim of legitimacy, the Koh
claim of internalization of norms, or any other leading norm-based pillar of
international law scholarship.'0 This, despite the fact that these normative
views have long been vigorously asserted. " This is also so despite the fact that
normative international law remains (unsurprisingly) the overwhelmingly
"oThe exception to this, perhaps, is the scholarship of "disaggregation" of the state,
represented in this symposium by Peter Spiro's article, and found elsewhere as the basis of one
of the few full-blown critiques of The Limits of International Law, Paul Schiff Berman's
impressive Seeing Beyond the Limits of InternationalLaw, 84 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006)
(reviewing JACKL. GoDSMmH& ERicA. POSNER,THE LIMrrs OFINTERNATIONALLAW (2005)).
I deal with the disaggregation issue further on, but for now note that it is a form, too, of taking
the ghost out of the machine and explicating its effects by an account of substate actors or, in
other words, a more detailed account of the workings of the machine. It can be seen, for
purposes of the discussion here, as consistent with rationalism and rational choice.
" See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, How STATES BEHAVE (1979); THOMAs FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599 (1997).
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favored paradigm among the nonscholarly parts of international law-the
activists, the NGOs, and the activist-scholars. One might conclude from this
either that The Limits of InternationalLaw is considered too lightweight a
target-one not worth getting worked up about-or else that, internal problems
notwithstanding, it represents a largely unanswerable challenge to normative
international law methodologies. Is the threat it poses too small or too large?
And from what does the threat arise-from methodological rationalism, from
political revisionism, or from rationalismforcing revisionism?
2.
STRIPPING AWAY THE VEIL OF IDEOLOGY

One way to address the threat to norm-based international law is as
Hathaway and Lavinbuk do, by severing the link between The Limits of
InternationalLaw's rationalist methodological agenda and its revisionist
political one. The consequences are peculiarly complicated.
On the one hand, at the level of method in international law, rationalism
threatens the ghost-in-the-machine character of traditional norm-based
international law. It demands an explanation of the normative force of
international law in nonnormative, rationalizing terms, which in turn, by
eliminating the ghost, require a more elaborate explication of the machine. Yet
even the rational method may come to the same empirical conclusion that is
reached by the normative method: that international law, mediated through
substate actors for example, or by some other mechanism, is more than mere
state interest and must be accounted for as such. On the other hand, at the
level of politics in international law, Goldsmith and Posner's revisionism
threatens not merely the normative method of international law, but also the
particular political norms to which the dominant international law project is
attached, viz., liberal internationalism. Yet if the revisionist agenda is not a
logical consequence of the rationalist method, as Hathaway and Lavinbuk
claim it is not, then the revisionist political agenda, like the particular norms
of the dominant international law project of liberal internationalism, is just
another particular set of political values. It is just ideology.
The threat of The Limits of InternationalLaw, if Hathaway and Lavinbuk
are permitted to revise Goldsmith and Posner's rationalism, is to a certain
method, not to the particular political commitments-the liberal
internationalism-typical of its norm-based adherents. Whereas the most
provocative claim of The Limits ofInternationalLaw (unrevised) is that liberal
internationalism, insofar as it depends upon the independent weight of
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international law and institutions, is chimerical. In effect, democratic
sovereignty-not liberal internationalism-is the most one might normatively
hope for, because in the end international law is (in semi-Marxist terms) just
a superstructural illusion of the material base of state interest. 2 The quasiMarxist, quasi-critical theory promise of The Limits of InternationalLaw-to
strip away the veil of ideology in order to behold state interest-no longer as
through a glass darkly, but face to face, for itself, for what it is-carries, of
course, a certain irony, given the nation-state-bourgeois political values of
Goldsmith and Posner's revisionism. And no doubt they, too, would be
skeptical that the method of rational choice is really about piercing the veil of
ideology.' 3 Still, seen from a level of abstraction one step up from rational
choice theory, 'stripping away the veil of ideology' is a fair description of the
project.
3.
RESCUING LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

The seemingly strategic aim of the Hathaway and Lavinbuk
approach-indeed, seemingly that of most of the symposium critiques as
well-is, contrary to Goldsmith and Posner's expressed views, to effect a
rescue of the substantive politics of liberal internationalism. Hathaway and
Lavinbuk seek a rescue even at the expense of liberal internationalism's
traditional method.' 4 Or, if not definitively to rescue liberal internationalism
as the substantive political outcome of international law methodology, properly
understood, then at least to render it a possible outcome, one consistent with
the new rationalism in international law. I understand this to be the
fundamental commonality among most, if not all, of the critiques offered at the
symposium. Rationalism as a method emerges, if not necessarily committed

to the politics of liberal internationalism, then at least neutral with respect to
it.

12 Not quite, of course, because as discussed below, interest is relaxed to include more than

purely "material" interest. This is the "bourgeois" in Goldsmith and Posner, although even the
broad meaning of "interest" could well be accommodated in several of the versions of Marxism
described by, for example, PERRY ANDERSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON WESTERN MARXISM (1979).
'" The curious resemblance to DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (AFAR 1983) is deliciously
unmistakable.
14 Sacrifices must be made.
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Hathaway and Lavinbuk claim essentially that the revisionist political
agenda of The Limits of InternationalLaw contaminates the purity of the
rationalist methodological agenda; they set forth to cleanse it. In the process,
they claim to make rationalism if not entirely hospitable, then at least safe, for
liberal internationalism.
4.
REALISM IN THE SERVICE OF IDEALISM

My reading of Goldsmith and Posner' s fundamental claim is quite different.
It is, however, likely quite different from what Goldsmith and Posner would
see in their own work. The reason is that I speak as an idealist, not a realist.
True, this idealism is not attached to liberal internationalism, as is usually the
case in international law scholarship, but instead to "democratic sovereignty"
as the ideal position in international relations and law. In other words, it
attaches to something like the revisionist political position that Hathaway and
Lavinbuk correctly ascribe to Goldsmith and Posner. Nevertheless, it is a form
of idealism, arrived at from argument on moral grounds, through a process
altogether similar to the idealism that brings thinkers such as Henkin, Franck,
or Koh to liberal internationalism. We share a common moral framework of
idealism even if we reach different conclusions with regard to democratic
sovereignty and liberal internationalism.
How might one characterize that common moral framework? The tension
between liberal internationalism and democratic sovereignty is profound. But
as ideals, both seek reform of a certain version of Westphalianism. " Liberal
internationalism seeks to replace the Westphalian concert of nations with
genuine global governance, a federal world, a cosmopolitan world. It is
characterized by adherence to two ideal propositions: First, there is, or finally
ought to be, a political authority higher than the nation-state; this is its
federalism or its constitutionalism.16 Second, Kantian rectitude holds that in

's I use "Westphalian" here in its common understanding of a nation-state system based on
sovereignty-control of territory and a population therein and hence, non-interference by
outsiders. I accept Stephen D. Krasner's correction that this form of sovereignty does not arise
with the peace of Westphalia, but actually much later, in the eighteenth century. See STEPHEN
D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20-25 (1999).
16 See, e.g., Peter Spiro, Treaties,InternationalLaw, and ConstitutionalRights, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1999 (2003); Erika de Wet, The InternationalConstitutionalOrder,55 INT'L& COMP.
L.Q. 51 (2006); Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining the InternationalCommunity, 13 EUR. J. INT'LL. 961
(2002).
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the ideal world-even if not in one we can fully bring about-neither borders
nor distance, nor lack of affection, relation, membership, or affinity, carry
moral weight with respect to moral duties of either the individual or the state.' 7
God is no respecter of persons and neither is the Leviathan-this is its
cosmopolitanism. 8
Democratic sovereignty as a moral position rejects both of those
propositions. But it also rejects a certain Westphalianism that asserts that
sovereignty consists merely of governmental control over a particular territory
and its inhabitants. 9 The full ideal of democratic sovereignty requires more,
and it draws upon a Western conception of sovereignty that is older than
Westphalia and certainly more exigent. As James Turner Johnson explains,
the "rights of sovereignty are linked to its obligations," and sovereignty is
therefore:
essentially a moral construct; a person (or people) in sovereign
authority is responsible for the good of his, her, or their political
community, for the 'common weal'. This implied establishing an
order that served justice and achieved peace. Also implied as a
part of this responsibility was an obligation to other political
communities to support order, justice, and peace in and among
them. Failure to discharge the sovereign's obligations removed
the rights of sovereignty.2'

'7 The problem of affection in morality is discussed with great acuity in Peter Railton,
Alienation, Consequentialism,and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 134 (1984).
This article was one of the first in a great wave of consideration of the ethics of affection and the
particularity of love. But as Railton notes in that article, the inability fully to account for
ordinary moral feelings for particular people-love, attachment, and affection for particular
people over others-is a problem equally of Kantian duty and utilitarianism.
"8This is, of course, describing the ideal position, not the necessarily more accommodating
versions developed to exist in the real world. Goldsmith and Posner take pains, in their account
of cosmopolitan duty, to note that most of the theorists of cosmopolitanism in fact take
"plausibility" of enactment and execution, whether psychological, or social, or political, into
account, thus allowing them a measure of departure from the severity of the ideal Kantian norm.
See GOLDSMrrH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 208-09. I discuss this in more detail later.
19 I take my ideas directly here from the most recent book of the great historian and
theologian of just war theory, JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, THE WAR TO OUST SADDAM HUSSEIN:
JUST WAR AND THE NEW FACE OF CONFLICr 62 (2005).
20 Id. The thinner Westphalian conception is not without its reasons, of course. The horrors
of the Thirty Years War, which were motivated ostensibly by differences of religion, offered
ample grounds that even a concern for order, peace, and justice, not to mention a care for
eternal souls, might lead to intervention and imposition; better to give up the right to interfere
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I do not suppose, in other words, that the great liberal internationalist
representatives I have cited-Henkin, Franck, Koh et al.-would demur from
any of this. The question is what form of political order can best bring
liberalism about and, at the same time, be consistent with the great virtue of the
Peace of Westphalia, toleration of difference.
With respect to rationalism, therefore, my interest is to see what it has to
say about the realism, the realistic possibility, of the ideal position I have
tentatively reached on ideal grounds. What does it have to say about the
possibility of bringing about the ideal in the real world? I seek answers from
this rationalist method to prudential questions which are at once practical and
morally urgent. Is my beloved democratic sovereignty arguably the best ideal,
but nonetheless, for reasons predicted by rationalist game theory, hopelessly
and fatally utopian? Are there reasons for thinking that a world of cooperating
democratic sovereigns cannot reasonably come about, or that it would not be
very peaceable or even minimally cooperative? Or, perhaps worse, does this
rationalist method inform me that my ideal brings with it unintended
consequences that should cause me, however regretfully, to give it up as an
ideal?
And I want to know the same about liberal internationalism. What would
this rationalism tell me is the likelihood that its many good features could
come about? Is it hopelessly, fatally utopian? What will all the elaborate
game theory tell me about the unintended consequences of bringing about this
ideal? Is this not, in the end, what game theory is best at doing in a practical
sense-warning us of unintended consequences of varying likelihoods?
This way of looking at method and politics in international
law-hardheaded and practical and realistic, yet a realism always in the
service of idealism-mightseem, I acknowledge, something out of place in an
academic inquiry. It is rather unscholarly and indeed it may be unintellectual.

at all than risk a war between rival conceptions of the religious good. See generallyGEOFFREY
PARKER, THE TIRTY YEARS' WAR (2d ed. 1987). It is thus upon historical grounds bitterly
acquired that we arrive at Lincoln's definition of sovereignty, "a political community, without
a political superior." Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861),
in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINcoLN 421, 434 (Roy P. Bassler ed., 1953).
Nonetheless, the full conception of democratic sovereignty today is not indifferent to universal
values-prohibitions against genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of human
rights-across borders and within a state. I am using "democratic" here as shorthand, in other
words, for a panoply of liberal political goods, including constitutionalism and human rights, but
within a particular sovereign political community.
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It is the inquiry of a moraliste rather than an academic. 2' Nonetheless I am
unrepentant in believing that this is the urgent question for the rationalism that
Goldsmith and Posner propose, and which the symposium participants as well
as Hathaway and Lavinbuk propose to revise yet also extend, and which we
seem generally agreed will come to occupy an important, perhaps even
premier, methodological place in the academy of international law. What will
this rationalism, this realism, tell us about our available choices among ideal
positions in international law and relations?
5.
DEFINING THE MORALISTE's REALISM, OR, THE MORAL
DUTY OF THE KING

"[M]aintain power in as decent a way as would yet be the most effective.

22

6.
AVAILABLE IDEALIST POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
RELATIONS

If the above sentiment (it is what the Lady of the Lake tells King Arthur in
Thomas Berger's witty and profound retelling) captures the precise
relationship of a realism and its rationalist methodology in service to
idealism-conjoining decency and effectiveness, asserting power, yet yoking
it to morality-what, then, are the possible idealist positions?
We have so far discussed two idealist positions-liberal internationalism
and democratic sovereignty. There are, however, several others. One way of
conceptualizing these ideal positions is along a continuum, around the question
of the role and force of sovereignty
in international law. What would the range
23
like?
look
of positions

21 Iwant to acknowledge my great debt to Henry Steiner in bringing me to think in this way
about these questions, even though we reach somewhat different conclusions on the ideal
position. And by moralistehere, I mean the French intellectual tradition of Albert Camus,
Raymond Aron, and Ren6 Char, among others. I have also long been indebted to my friend
Bernard Poulet, editor ofL'Expansion (Paris), for many important conversations (over the years
in the midst of meetings we have shared together as board members of the nonprofit Media
Development Loan Fund) that have helped me locate these writers within contemporary French
thought.
22 THOMAS BERGER, ARTHUR REX: A LEGENDARY NOVEL 484 (1978).

23 I am drawing much of this discussion in an abbreviated fashion from Kenneth Anderson,
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1. Sovereignty as its own value, sovereignty for its own sake. The most
extreme position toward the sovereignty end of the range is the assertion of
sovereignty as its own value. It might seem, especially to some realists and
some liberal internationalists, peculiar to claim that sovereignty is actually a
value, an ideal position, rather than simply the assertion of power. It can be
understood as an actual value, however, by understanding it as the
underpinning for any autonomous political community-understood as an
ideal, it ascribes a certain value simply to the fact that a political community
orders itself without outside interference. In this sense, it is an assertion of
value for a democratic sovereign such as the United States, but with respect to
the narrow value of sovereignty, just as much an assertion of value for the
autocratic, repressive, theocratic, brutal monarchy that is Saudi Arabia. It is,
in other words, sovereignty understood as the value of self-determination, even
for societies that are cruel, unjust, and autocratic-we do acknowledge that,
within some limit gradually evolving as to genocide and massive internal
human rights abuses, even wicked societies have a right to self-determination.24
How much to ascribe to the value of bare sovereignty, sovereignty which is
grounded in no virtue or value other than the bare claim of self-determination?
Only as much one would ascribe to Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and the
rest of the world's worst dictators. It is worth noting that China's foreign
policy and view of international law, to the extent that it has any root at all in
ideals and is not simply relentlessly self-interest, is fundamentally simply the
assertion of the right and value of sovereignty, for its own sake.
2. Democraticsovereignty. The resurgence of sovereignty as a position
among some academics in international law, as well as in the rhetoric of the
Bush administration, is not really about the assertion of bare selfdetermination, sovereignty for its own sake. On the contrary, the 'new
sovereignty' positions put forward by such writers as Jeremy Rabkin, Julian
Ku, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, Curtis Bradley, and Jed Rubenfeld, among
others-the resurgence of a position that liberal internationalists thought was
buried permanently as an assertion of idealism, rather than merely a realist

Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global

Networks, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1255, 1260-66 (2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER (2005)).
24 This is essentially Walzer's argument in MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A
MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICALILLUSTRATIONS (2000). The account of self-determination

was possibly overly influenced by the experience of the Vietnam War; Walzer's more recent
writings, in Dissentand elsewhere, suggest that he has come to accept more external restrictions
on "bare" sovereignty than he did in the 1970s.
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reminder of the inconvenient facts of power-are all fundamentally dependent
upon the assertion of some value other than sovereignty. That value is, without
exception, democracy, the popular sovereignty of a self-governing people.
Sovereignty is essentially the vessel of power that protects within it another
value, that of democracy. Self-determination is, on this account, a residual
category, essentially subsumed within the value of democracy itself. It is for
precisely this reason, of course, that this view of sovereignty is available to the
world's constitutional democratic sovereigns in a way that it is not to the
world's autonomous dictatorships, who at most can reach to the 'bare' value
of sovereignty. But the fact of democratic self-rule, if it is robust, is that
fidelity to 'internal' democratic mechanisms makes it difficult to accommodate
to 'external' mechanisms of global governance, such as those urged by liberal
internationalism and global constitutionalism. At bottom, the condition stated
by Abraham Lincoln for constitutional sovereign democracy, a "political
community, without a political superior," will in practice, if not absolutely in
theory, bar absorption into a larger global federal society. That is even more
true if the theory upon which global governance asserts its legitimacy is not
popular sovereignty from the bottom-up, the actual votes of people from the
bottom up, but instead universal values (as liberal internationalism does with
universal human rights) from the top down.
3. Sovereign state multilateralism. Just because states (re)assert the
conditions of democratic sovereignty does not deprive them of the ability to
work together closely, in active and deep ways. The choice in order to have
an international political order is not liberal internationalism or nothing. On
the contrary, one needs to go beyond the robust multilateralism available to
freely cooperating sovereigns and, particularly, democratic sovereigns only if
the aim is to go beyond a merely "international political" order of sovereign
states to a genuinely global or transnational society-to transcend the merely
political and international in favor of a social and transnational order. If the
covert agenda is not this transformation of the international from a political
order to a "society," then strong multilateralism is what a functioning
international order would look like as an ideal of sovereign cooperation.
4. Multilateral pooled sovereignty, looking toward global federalism.
Multilateralism can be remade as an ideal by introducing to it an aspirational
condition-multilateralism today, but looking forward to a future day when
multilateralism is replaced by genuinely global institutions that transcend mere
states. That aspirational condition is expressed in the present not merely by
pious invocations of liberal internationalism, but instead by attempts to 'pool'
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sovereignty in ways that, in practical terms if not absolute legal ones, make
backing out difficult for a sovereign state.
5. Global governance throughNGOs partneredwith public international
organizations. As NGOs asserted themselves throughout the 1990s with
respect to both sovereign states and international organizations, a new ideal of
global governance arose which idealized governance by a partnership of
international organizations that would receive legitimacy for their expanded
rule from international NGOs-recharacterized for the purpose of legitimation
as "global civil society." The function of NGOs in this ideal is thought to be
to supplying the missing democratic predicate that the international political
order so conspicuously lacks. Global civil society would "represent" the
peoples of the world to international organizations-the U.N. in
particular-and thus provide a ground of legitimacy that aims to bypass
sovereign states as the (limiting) source of international organization
legitimacy, on the one hand, and overcome the charge of a 'democracy deficit,'
on the other. These theories of global governance and legitimacy are still with
us today, but they probably reached their apogee with the Millennium summit
of 2000, when Kofi Annan essentially blessed global civil society as a stand-in
for the peoples of the world. Since that moment, however, a host of critics
have--quite successfully--challenged the bona fides of international NGOs
to call themselves representatives of anything other than themselves or to
overcome the democracy deficit of international institutions. It continues,
however, to be a powerful element defining the dynamic of interaction
between the U.N. and international NGOs--each grants the other the
legitimacy it lacks. Moreover, it is a crucial element in the attempt by liberal
internationalism to convert an international political order into a global social
order, in order to attain the legitimacy that comes with being a society and not
merely a politics. 25 The ideal no longer strives quite so hard to suggest that
' The point here is essentially a Weberian one. In Weber's conception, institutions can have
legitimacy, but institutional legitimacy is less a matter of politics than being institutions of a
larger and broader legitimate social order-sharing as institutions in the legitimacy that really
matters for Weber, the legitimacy that attaches to a larger legitimate social order. The task for
liberal internationalism or global constitutionalism, however one styles it, then, is not essentially
political. It is, far more importantly, social-the transformation of what is now essentially a
political order into a social order. That is, at bottom, what is meant when senior U.N. officials,
for example, talk wistfully-as Mark Malloch Brown does on occasion--of modernizing the
U.N. to make it less a creature of member states. At one level, the issue is member states and
their demands. At a deeper level, the desire is to move beyond the political order implied by
'states' to a society that is populated by states, yes, but also by individual actors such as
diplomats and international bureaucrats, and above all, by NGOs that can serve as a kind of
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NGOs should actually have a role in governance-while still asserting quite
strongly that NGOs play a crucial role in the legitimation of presumed global
governance institutions such as the U.N. Since it is legitimacy that transforms
power into authority and presses forward an upward spiral of power
reinforcing authority reinforcing legitimacy, the terms of this essentially
ideological debate are highly important and, hence, highly contested.
6. Globalgovernanceby globalgovernment networks. The difficulties for
legitimizing global governance because of the difficulties of the democratic
legitimacy of the combination of NGOs and international organizations have
not gone unnoticed. Accordingly, within the past few years, another proposal
for global governance has emerged, championed by Anne-Marie Slaughter in
her quite remarkable book, A New World Order.26 Her alternative proposal
acknowledges from the outset that the problem of democratic legitimacy for
NGOs and international organizations is real and cannot be overcome by forms
of words that simply attempt to redefine the meaning of democracy to make it
conveniently fit a liberal internationalist model. 2 In place of international
organizations or NGOs or both, Slaughter proposes networks of national
government actors-bureaucrats and judges, principally, using their national
authority in networks towards common goals. What makes this more than
simply robust multilateralism is her vision that over time, these actors become
socialized toward a "horizontal" global orientation, alongside their
homologues in other places around the world, along with their "vertical"
loyalties within their own societies. It attempts to solve the democratic deficit
by using actors who indeed have democratic legitimacy within actual nation

proxy for the "peoples of the world" necessary to claim that the international order is not merely
a politics but a society-to claim the legitimacy that, for Weber, obtains for a social order. For
those seeking an easier point of entry into this literature than launching directly into the two
volume set MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIoLOGY
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978), and the famous discussion of the condition of a
legitimate social order in volume 1, I recommend chapter 3 of the book WOLFGANG J.
MOMMSEN, THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY OF MAX WEBER 44 (1989), entitled Max
Weber's Theory of Legitimacy Today.
26 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005); see my review at Anderson,
supra note 23; see also Peter Berkowitz, Laws of Nations, POL'Y REV., April-May 2005,
available at http://www.policyreview.org/apr05/berkowitz.htm, reviewing the Slaughter book
along with The Limits ofInternationalLaw and JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WrrHOuT NATIONS? WHY
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005).

27 The theorist most prone to "solving" the democracy problem by mere definitional fiat is
surely David Held. See, among many similar works, DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE
GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995).
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states, while still finding a global basis for action by actors who see themselves
as having obligations both nationally and globally. My own view is that this
careful balancing act must eventually collapse into liberal internationalism-that
is, into a set of loyalties that are finally international and global rather than
national-but the attempt to solve the dilemma straight on, without definitional
fiat, and without denying both that democracy cannot exist on a planetary level
and that global government as such would be, for that reason alone,
undesirable, is the most intelligent move forward in the global governance
debate in at least a decade.
7. Liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalism is characterized by
the unapologetic, naked claim that the point is finally not multilateralism
exercised however robustly by sovereign states, but the irrevocable ceding of
that sovereignty to a higher authority than the nation state or any political
community other than the planet as a whole. This condition, as I note further
on, requires a further condition, viz., the acceptance of a cosmopolitanism on
the part of at least the governing elites of this global order-one that requires
that they put their allegiance first to a global order over any merely national or
local order and, in keeping with the move from a politics to a society, that they
think of themselves as social actors within a global society, which is to say, as
cosmopolitans who share a society, values, allegiances, and social relations
with others of that global society. These are, of course, very strong conditions,
and liberal internationalism acknowledges it as an aspirational ideal. But the
fact that it is the central aspiration sets the terms for what multilateralism is
supposed to be and supposed to accomplish. It is not, on this conception,
enough for multilateralism to succeed at whatever its narrow task might be; it
must also and, in some sense, more importantly serve to chip away at the
conditions of sovereignty that underlie pure multilateralism. And finally,
liberal internationalism is characterized by (and goes beyond aspirational
multilateralism because it asserts) a system of values-universal human
rights-which, in its view, actually trump even claims of democracy and the
natural expression of democracy within a constituted national political
community, popular sovereignty. Liberal internationalism looks to the
ideology of human rights as a means of overcoming the claims of democracy
and popular sovereignty of self-governing political community-it asserts that
the universal-understood, in a certain sleight of hand, to be identical with
international-values of human rights take precedence even over local
democracy. Since 'universal' is assumed to be identical with 'international,'
international values must inevitably be accepted over local ones. Liberal
internationalists are quite correct in seeing it as global constitutionalism and
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global federalism. Liberal internationalism is 'liberal' insofar as its human
rights universals have a 'liberal' content (although increasingly, in the
emerging conflicts with Islam-as-ideology, human rights are taking on not a
liberal content, but a multicultural one that, in effect, blames 'dominant'
Western culture for any lapses in respect for human rights by Muslims). 28
28 See, e.g., the remarkable briefing statement by Human Rights Watch regarding the
publication of the Muhammad cartoons in Denmark. For an organization devoted presumably
to human rights with a 'liberal' content, it has shown itself strikingly less and less comfortable
with the most 'liberal' value of all-at least Voltaire would have thought so-free expression.
The storm over the cartoons broke open in violence and rioting in January 2006; Human Rights
Watch, so impressively quick to comment on nearly everything else, did not manage to express
any view at all for weeks, finally posting a briefing statement in the form of questions and
answers on February 15, 2006. One wonders, frankly, what internal debates went on that
required weeks for an organization ordinarily so swift to put statements in the hands of the press
finally to issue a statement on a matter that a liberal, as distinguished from a multiculturalist,
would have thought quite easy. See Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers on the
Danish CartoonsandFreedom of Expression: When Speech Offends, Feb. 15, 2006, http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2006/02/15/denmarl2676.htm. The background statement manages-with
significant multiculturalist hedging-finally to reach a conclusion that the publication of the
cartoons could not be banned.
In reaching that final conclusion, however, HRW begins by essentially casting blame, in
an exercise of multiculturalist responsibility-shifting, off of rioting and violent mobs and onto
discriminatory European states: "The cartoon controversy should be understood," says HRW,
"against a backdrop of rising Western prejudice and suspicion directed against Muslims, and an
associated sense of persecution among Muslims in many parts of the world. In Europe, rapidly
growing Muslim communities have become the continent's largest religious minority but also
among its most economically disadvantaged communities and the target of discriminatory and
anti-immigration measures." Id. Is that really how it should be understood-against a backdrop
of rising Western prejudice and suspicion of Muslims? Is that really how a liberal, not a
multiculturalist, would understand it? Surely a real liberal would write, instead, as Christopher
Hitchens does:
The incredible thing about the ongoing Kristallnacht against Denmark (and
in some places, against the embassies and citizens of any Scandinavian or
even European Union nation) is that it has resulted in, not opprobrium for the
religion that perpetrates and excuses it, but increased respectability! A small
democratic country with an open society, a system of confessional pluralism,
and a free press has been subjected to a fantastic, incredible, organized
campaign of lies and hatred and violence, extending to one of the gravest
imaginable breaches of international law and civility: the violation of
diplomatic immunity. And nobody in authority can be found to state the
obvious and the necessary-that we stand with the Danes against this
defamation and blackmail and sabotage. Instead, all compassion and concern
is apparently to be expended upon those who lit the powder trail, and who
yell and scream for joy as the embassies of democracies are put to the torch
in the capital cities of miserable, fly-blown dictatorships. Let's be sure we
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8. Parliamentaryworld government. Parliamentary world government is
frequently ridiculed as an ideal in global governance, not only by
sovereigntists hostile to the whole idea of global governance, but frequently
by liberal internationalists eager to show that there is something still further
"out there" that is not liberal internationalism and presumably makes it seem
less radical. The ridicule is misplaced, however, for a very important reason.
The call for parliamentary world democracy-a new chamber in the U.N., for
example, is sometimes suggested, one that might consist of parliamentarians

haven't hurt the vandals'feelings. You wish to say that it was instead a small
newspaper in Copenhagen that lit the trail? What abject masochism and
nonsense. It was the arrogant Danish mullahs who patiently hawked those
cartoons around the world (yes, don't worry, they are allowed to exhibit them
as much as they like) until they finally provoked a vicious response against
the economy and society of their host country.
Christopher Hitchens, Stand Upfor Denmark: Why Are We Not Defending OurAlly?, SLATE,
Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2136714/.
At some point, the break between a certain form of liberalism, as found in supposedly
universal human rights values, and a form of liberalism rewritten by multiculturalism, seems
inevitable. At that point, too, however, the evidence provided by HRW suggests that the
"international community" is likely to incline toward multicultural, rather than liberal, content
for the supposedly universal values of human rights, as these international elites attempt to ride
the tiger of managing civilizational discord through assertions of universality whose terms they
purport to control. But one of the many disasters of multiculturalism is that, as an essentially
managerial discourse from above, it seeks to placate various threatening constituencies by
excusing their extra-legitimate exercises of power, often through violence or threats of
violence-but then it turns out not to be able to 'manage' them anyway, losing both the struggle
over universals and substantive liberal values all at the same time.
If this be thought far afield from the definition of liberal internationalism, it is not. On the
contrary, it points out what might, over time, turn out to be one of defining characteristics of
liberal internationalism-that it turns out not to be 'liberal' internationalism but, instead,
'multicultural' internationalism. It might turn out that the values that underpin liberal
internationalism-the content of its assertedly trumping human rights discourse-turn out not
to be liberal in content after all, but gradually shift away from liberal values, Enlightenment
values, to something quite different. All the more reason, therefore, to be skeptical of
internationalhuman rights, as determined by international bodies and the managerial, top down
culture of the "international community," as being identical with "universal" values. Global
constitutionalism, that is, might turn out to be not about a liberal constitution at all.
The consequence of all this? Well, it might turn out that the most vehement supporters
of democratic sovereignty in the future turn out to be not Americans, but Western Europeans
seeking to defend a liberal secular order not merely from religious attack by religionists who
have no use for modernity except as a vehicle to technology, but additionally from religious
attack buttressed by a form of international human rights that has moved from liberalism to
multiculturalism. It might well be those Europeans, not Americans, most eager to find an
ideological ground on which to defend the social space of a substantive liberalism.
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elected from countries in the manner of the European Parliament-has the
profound virtue of acknowledging, without evasion or cant, that democracy
matters. It acknowledges that no form of global governance can legitimately
exist, at least with strong authority, without democratic structures in their
ordinary sense-raising hands and voting. It attempts no definitional end-runs
around the meaning of democracy and for that it should be admired and
respected. You may believe, as I do, that parliamentary democracy cannot
exist meaningfully at the level of the whole planet-democracy does not "scale
up" forever, and what we call the world's largest democracies, such as the
United States or India, are only partially democratic precisely because of their
size. But the forthrightness of the parliamentary world government ideal must
be celebrated, not scorned.
It bears noting that this continuum is one of idealisms. It is not about a
continuum from idealism to realism. Instead, it aims to show that the old
realist-idealist divide is less important today than the debates among those who
are all idealists. Once upon a time, idealism simply meant liberal
internationalism, tempered by the brute facts of realism, of real power. Today,
the debates are among different views of idealism.
7.
DEMOCRATIC SOVEREIGNTY AS LAST MAN STANDING?

Set against this range of possible ideal positions, and with realism put in
service to some form of idealism, we can see what The Limits ofInternational
Law might imply. Contrary to what Hathaway and Lavinbuk argue, that
political revisionism contaminates methodological rationalism, the rationalism
(if successful at any rate) forces the revisionism. It forces the revisionism
because the independent rationalism tells us that, in fact, international law and
institutions simply reflect state interest. Liberal internationalist suprastate
institutions and international law are thus not the independent repositories of
moral values that their champions claim them to be, at least if it is supposed
that these moral values independently sway state behavior. That is the
consequence if Goldsmith and Posner successfully argue their rationalism.
This is emphatically not to say that the morality valued by liberal
internationalism does not exist if Goldsmith and Posner' s rationalism turns out
to be correct. Certainly it exists and carries weight. But it exists only insofar
as it is the expression of states and state interest.
Appearances
notwithstanding, such values are not part of genuinely independent structures
of liberal internationalism, because those structures are not genuinely
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independent; they are (for this purpose strictly construed) illusory, a construct
of ideology. In other words, it is not that rationalism is completely removed
from any consideration of values. It is, rather, that rationalism in Goldsmith
and Posner's hands demonstrates that the only place where values can obtain
a purchase is within the behavior of states-not independently through
international law or institutions of international law. Rationalism is neither
hostile nor indifferent to moral values. But the only place where they obtain
is within states which, one hopes, will be internally democratic (in the broad
sense) and then reflect those values at least somewhat in their external
behavior.
If Goldsmith and Posner are right, the consequence of the rationalist project
for idealism is, in effect, to leave only state interest standing. The best one can
hope for-as a matter of values, morality, and ideology-is that state interest
incorporate into itself notions of democratic and human rights morality,
because international law cannot and will not as a matter of independent force.
Democratic sovereignty and the values one can build into the nation state are
what matter-not what one builds into international law and institutions and
governance, except to the minimal extent that those reflect-supervene
upon-shifting configurations of state interest.
Democratic sovereignty, if Goldsmith and Posner's rationalism is right, is
therefore the last man standing after stripping away the veil of ideology by
rational choice method. Marxian, indeed.
8.
THE STAKES

The question of whether the method of rational choice (as Goldsmith and
Posner offer it) forces revisionist politics or whether, as their critics would
have it, it does not, raises immensely the 'value' stakes.
9.
RESCUING THE GHOST?

Yet no one seems willing to argue any more for the ghost in the machine,
for the independent, something like spiritual,power of idealism to tug states
qua states toward adherence to international law. Instead everyone seems to
have accepted that the ghost, or the effects of the ghost, can be better explained
by a more finely-tuned comprehension of the machine.
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Let me suggest, however, that this judgment might be too quick. It might
be too much in thrall to the buzz of rationalism. In at least some areas of
international law, one might argue for the independent moral effect of
international law. The case is ambiguous. The ambiguity itself, however,
perhaps sheds light on the difficulty involved in arguing over questions that are
ultimately of intention and motivation.
Consider the laws of war, and in particularjus in bello, legal rules for the
conduct of war. Posner has written (with Goldsmith) on rational choice
applied to international law; he has written equally provocatively on applying
rational choice theory to the international laws of war, based around game
theory and reciprocal responses in order to show the evolution of rules.2 9 The
rationalist methodology has the effect, once again, of taking morality out of the
machine of rules evolution and replacing it with a series of games based
around repeat players, cooperation and defection, and so on. Based
fundamentally on a state-to-state model, it does not give independent weight
to the moral pull toward compliance of the international law of war.
Yet, to someone like myself, experienced on the ground as a human rights
observer in numerous armed conflicts, the fact of the moral weight of
international rules for the conduct of war seems undeniable. The commitment
by soldiers on a personal moral and legal basis to the rules of war-something
I have observed repeatedly in conflicts around the world-seems to me plainly
a commitment based upon the legitimacy of the rules in Franck' s sense and the
internalization of the rules in Koh's sense. Legitimacy and internalization
"tug" these actors toward granting an independent status for the rules of war
as international law. This I have found to be true even where a knowledge of
the legal rules was rudimentary at best, understood merely at the level of
"don't shoot the civilians."
Put another way, the metaphor of the ghost in the machine is often
characterized as a mythologizing construct that disappears once we look more
closely at the detailed workings of the machine. The need for an animating
force beyond the mechanisms of the machine disappears. Viewed from the
outside, it appears to be magic, but viewed more closely, the spinning wheels
can be seen. Rational choice gives us the more finely ground microscope lens
to look through. Seen from afar, international law and institutions seem to be
carrying out agendas independent of mere state interest and exerting a
mysterious force upon states that cannot be accounted for except by the moral
motivation of the ideal of international law itself. Seen more closely, the state
29

Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 297 (2003).
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interest turns out to be more finely tuned after all. Yet that said, the law of
armed conflict, when observed as I and others have observed it, from within
the machine, close up, at the most detailed level, appears to be unquestionably
driven by idealistic motivation for the sake of morality, if not always for the
law itself.
If that characterization is correct, then we might have an instance within
international law in which a body of international law exerts independent
moral weight, tugging toward compliance, not because of state interest, nor
even because of state interest taking account of certain values, but instead
because the individual actors within the system, i.e. soldiers and officers,
accept the legitimacy of the internationalrules, internalize them in a literally
psychological sense, as internationalrules, law and morality. They do this
moreover as part of a transborder fraternity of warriors with obligations owed
to warriors on the other side of the state-to-state divide, not because of the
state, but independently of it and, indeed, in some cases despite it.3" Would
30 As Michael Walzer accurately describes the ritualized nature of First World War aerial
warfare: "[T]hey fought in accordance with a strict code of conduct that they invented
themselves." WALZER, supra note 24, at 35-36.
I set aside the obvious and correct retort to the idea that this counts as a "counterexample"
to the Goldsmith-Posner thesis-that, as Walzer himself acknowledges in that same passage, in
modem war such instances of warriors adhering to a code of conduct beyond that sanctioned by
the state is quite rare, and rarer still is the instance of professional soldiers adhering to a
transborder code of conduct that has been affirmatively rejected by the state. It therefore does
not tell us anything about real behavior on a wide scale of soldiers and states. On the contrary,
looking across the whole twentieth century, as technology changes, rules of war change or are
swept away, even if states-consistent with Goldsmith and Posner's "talk is cheap" claim-go
through elaborate opinio juris aimed at showing what amounts to, when all is said and done:
'consistent with x, not x.' A good example of this is the use of gas warfare in the First World
War. Having set upon the path of using gas, both sides nonetheless went to very considerable
lengths to argue that the use of poison gas was not covered by customary international law of war
prohibitions on the use of poison, which had most recently been affirmed at that point in the
Hague Regulations of 1907 article 23(a), not even ten years before the use of gas in the Great
War. Despite the qualms of a few commanders about their moral duties, the policies of states
quite naturally prevailed as authoritative and binding international law. I discuss the history of
the prohibition on poison in relation to First World War gas in a 2004 expert declaration in
Agent Orange litigation, available at http:llwww.wcl.american.edulfaculty/anderson/docs/
declaration2004_l 1.pdf?rd=l, at paragraphs 38-40 and citations thereunder; for a general
discussion of chemical weapons, see JONATHON B. TUCKER, WAR OF NERvES: CHEMICAL
WARFARE FROM WORLD WAR I TO AL-QAEDA (2006). My interest in these Remarks lies in
seeing, in the ambiguities, how the argument over the "tug" of international law, whether in
general or the lex specialis of the international law of war, takes on the character of a more
general philosophical debate over the nature of intention and motivation, a point I make slightly
later.
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this count as a counterexample, even a specialized one, against the claim of
Goldsmith and Posner that international law as such demonstrates no
independent weight? Is this an instance of international law carrying weight
independently of state interest on account of its legitimacy, its internalization,
or some other norm-based factor that cannot be accounted for by the calculus
of The Limits of InternationalLaw?
10.
NUMQUAM PONENDA EST PLURITAS SINE NECESSITATE

The Goldsmith-Posner thesis thus appears to be a kind of Occam' s Razor
for international law. Yet Occam's Razor is never conclusive, only prima
facie; a rule of methodology, not of proof.
11.
DISAGGREGATION

But now ambiguities that undermine the case. The pull spoken of here is
a pull upon individuals, officers and soldiers, not upon states as such.
Goldsmith and Posner attack a thesis that international law exercises an
independent tug of obligation, whether one describes it as legal or moral, upon
states. It is not surprising that individuals find themselves tugged one way or
another by senses of moral and legal obligation. The question is whether states
demonstrate such in their behavior.
This is a special case of an objection put by many critics-Peter Spiro3 and
Kal Raustiala32 in this symposium and by Paul Schiff Berman in his review
essay, among others.33 The model that Goldsmith and Posner rely upon
depends, it is said, on an unrealistic view of the state as a unitary actor,
represented at most by what Goldsmith and Posner call its leaders. The state
as they conceive it does not suffer from multiple actors, multiple aims,
multiple agendas. It is a simplifying assumption that proves fatal to the game
theory models. Instead, the "state" should be seen as a nexus of competing and
contradictory actors, with multiple motivations, pressures, agendas, and
outcomes. The state, in other words, should be "disaggregated."34 Once

" Spiro, supra note 7.
32 Raustiala, supra note 3.
3' Berman, supra note 10.
34See SLAUGHTER, supra note 26; see also Anderson, supra note 23, at 1294, 1303.
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disaggregated, the pull of international law upon the state becomes simply the
pull of international law upon particular actors within the state, and the
problem of motivation disappears. International law pulls them and they pull
the "state." Rationalism and liberal internationalism are once again not
inconsistent one with the other.
Goldsmith and Posner have various responses to the question of why the
claim of disaggregation does not fatally undermine their model of state
behavior. I wish to set all those aside and concede, for my part, that under
some circumstances the state might very well be "disaggregated" in the way
that the critics propose. My objection to that is not that it might not occur-it
very well might.35 Indeed, many of the critics urge precisely the
transformation of the state and its apparatus that would make such
disaggregation possible. My objection, in contrast, is normative.
12.
DISAGGREGATION' S DISCONTENTS AND THE COMING METHODOLOGICAL
ROLE OF SOCIAL THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Those who celebrate the deus ex machina of disaggregation might consider
precisely what they celebrate. After all, the thesis of The Limits of
InternationalLaw is quite happy-descriptively and prescriptively-with the
idea that in a democratic state values consonant with the precepts of
international law should bubble up, whether from above or below, and become
the policy of the state's leadership and hence of the state. The disaggregation
thesis does not challenge The Limits of InternationalLaw on this point-it is
what, for Goldsmith and Posner (as well, I should add, for me), democratic
sovereignty is supposed to be all about. If international law is a useful device
for memorializing our democratically-reached intentions as a state, then that
is all very well. All the disaggregation thesis adds to what is already in
Goldsmith and Posner is the claim that one can achieve adherence to
international law and institutions in ways that go outside the institutions of
democratic governance. And critics not infrequently add this claim with a
certain breathless frisson of moral approval--or else a sigh of relief. Whereas
" Failed states, for example in Africa and elsewhere, are surely "disaggregated." It is
curious that no one seems to cite these purest examples of disaggregation; it is equally curious
that the literature of disaggregation, so far as I am aware, fails to note that on a genuinely neutral
view of disaggregation, the most disaggregating practices within a state are corruption, bribery,
and rent-seeking by officials. Those, and civil war. Perhaps this is uncharitable, however, and
I have missed this discussion in the literature.
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I am at a loss to understand what I should celebrate in what amounts to an end
run around democratic institutions. Disaggregation is, without question, the
most important theoretical move in global governance theory in over a
decade-the move to call for disaggregation of the state in order to
disaggregate sovereignty itself in favor of liberal internationalism. 6 It is an
explicit call to achieve the primacy of international law and institutions by
undertaking the long march through the explicitly undemocraticinstitutions of
the state-state bureaucracies and judiciaries-to take advantage of their
legitimacy within democratic states. Disaggregation seeks to resocialize these
bureaucrats and judges, to shift their internalized loyalties away from the
citoyen to the cosmopolitan, the citizen of nowhere.
This is supposed to be a moral step forward? I demur. Insofar as it is a
political agenda, it is not an honest one, because it relies upon, and then
betrays, the trust that citizens in a democracy put in the acknowledged
undemocratic institutions of the state. It betrays their faith that even though
undemocratic, the 'undemocrats' are themselves also citizens, still servants of
the state and, ultimately, servants of its citizens as they themselves are citizens,
and not servants of others elsewhere.
Far more than a political agenda, however, disaggregation is a social
agenda: tentative but crucial steps in the formation of an internationalized
bourgeoisie, a bourgeoisie sharing a common transnational set of loyalties that,
in certain key matters, override their local loyalties. Which is why the most
important enquiry arising from the disciplines underlying international law at
this moment is not rationalism, game theory, rational choice, or indeed any
form of economic or political theory. It is, instead, social theory, and
specifically, the theory of the international new class.37 Social theory, and not
solely rational choice and other rationalist theories, might well turn out to be
36 The difference between disaggregating the state and disaggregating sovereignty is an

important one in Slaughter's theory. I believe I have faithfully captured the distinction: The
notion of a disaggregated state requires understanding the state not as a unitary institution, but
instead as an agglomeration of different centers of power, different institutions, and competing
actors... [tlhe disaggregation of sovereignty signifies that the constituent institutions and actors
of the disaggregated state achieve a measure of formal and legal sovereignty of their own-the
formal legal capacity to undertake activities within government networks and make them binding
upon their own disaggregated state. Anderson, supranote 23, at 1298.
3' The recent revitalization of the critical theory journal, Telos (following the untimely death
of its founding editor, the irascible, brilliant iconoclast Paul Piccone), under the leadership of
its new editor, Russell Berman, offers an opportunity to explore this in the journal most attuned
to the deep theory surrounding the sociology of the new class. Telos has promised a special
section on the international new class in 2006.
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the most important basal discipline of international law in the next generation
of scholarship. Intellectual how-to manuals for socializing judges and
bureaucrats in their new cosmopolitan duties are starting to appear in the
scholarly literature. 38 Let me suggest, however, that there is already an
extensive literature on the formation of class consciousness-why reinvent the
wheel?3 9
13.
THE MORALITY OF A PROFESSIONAL

The social theory so far suggested, insofar as the project of disaggregation
is concerned, is that of the new class.'
More broadly, however, the
disaggregation social project is concerned with the social identification of
4 1 Anne-Marie
professionals.
Slaughter's pioneering work, A New World
38 For example, Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
InternationalHuman Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621 (2004). Despite my normative reservations
about the project, it is a superb article, closely argued in both legal and social theory. See also
the extremely interesting colloquy among Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks and Jose E. Alvarez
and Harold Hongju Koh, Colloquy, Incrementalismand the AdministrativeState, 54 DuKE L.J.
961 (2005). These materials, among others, convince me that many people within international
law scholarship, committed to some version of liberal internationalism, believe that ultimately
the formation of a new global bourgeoisie is the necessary social condition of the political
project. Much rides on the social theory.
39 Just as I suggested earlier, somewhat mischievously, that Goldsmith and Posner are closet
Marxists, at least of a Western Marxist tradition, let me suggest that the new scholars of
socialization-socializing toward a sort of international bourgeoisie of judges and
bureaucrats-might find their theoretical work already done in the now forgotten Marxist
literature of class consciousness.
4 I have briefly, and rather satirically, proposed "new class" theory as a way of conceiving
of international elites, in Kenneth Anderson, SecularEschatologies and Class Interests of the
InternationalizedNew Class, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? (Peter
Juviler & Carrie Gustafson eds., 1999), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/
anderson/docs/secular-eschato.pdf?rd=l. A convenient entrance for legal academics into the
literature of new class theory is found in Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lawyers: The
Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1062 nn.30-38 (1996). The international
criminal law scholar Mark Osiel was recently amused, but not impressed, by the sketch of the
argument I make there; I agree with him that there is a lot of work to be done to make it
intellectually wholly defensible. See Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives
Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1751 n.315 (2005). For an explicitly Marxist
version of the argument, see LESLE S. KLAIR, THE TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS (2006).
" Two useful contemporary introductions to the sociology of professionals are, first, KEITH
M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OFTHE PROFESSIONS (1995) and, second, STEVEN BRINT, IN
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Order, is specifically about bureaucrats and judges.42 In the case I earlier
suggested, that of the laws of war, it is about soldiers and officers. Soldiering,
too, is a profession, one with a particular professional morality attached to it.
The point here against Goldsmith and Posner' s conception of international
law, at least as applied to the rules of war, is that adherence to the laws of war
is as much or more the product of the individual soldier's professional
commitment to the code of the warrior as the state's commitment to it.4" The
pull, as it were, of the law of war arises from the professional self-conception
of the soldier and the moral implications for how he or she fights. I repeat, this
has been my strongest impression of armies where the rules of armed conflicts
are obeyed, even in rudimentary form, and those where they are not. It was the
individual commitment-the personal internalization of rules and the belief
that they were legitimate, not just because of state policy, but across borders
and armies-that mattered in compliance. "The experience of land war in two
world wars," Sir Adam Roberts observes in his The Laws of War, "must
necessarily raise a question as to whether formal legal codification is
necessarily superior to notions of custom, honour, professional standards, and
natural law" in making for battlefield decencies. The great military historian
Sir John Keegan, reviewing that book in the Times Literary Supplement,
answers simply, "There is no substitute for honour as a medium for enforcing
decency on the battlefield, never has been, and never will be.""
Yet this is ambiguous. It might be taken to mean that individuals feel the
tug of international law upon them as law and act accordingly. But it might be
taken to mean much more naturally what Roberts suggests, that what matters
is not so much law as codification, but instead professional standards and
professional morality in adherence to the laws of war. A state adheres to the
laws of war because its officers do so as professionals. They have been
trained, socialized, to do so, and their adherence is a matter not of law, but
rather of professional morality and, in particular, professional honor. This

(1994). Macdonald covers, in addition to his own theorizing, the basic classical sociological
views of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx; Brint offers a critique of "new class" theory of the
professions, which I in turn critique in my Columbia Law Review review.
42 SLAUGHTER, supra note 26. She raises the case of national legislators mostly, however,
to note that they seem to lag behind in their cosmopolitanism.
41 See generally William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliancewith the
Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243 (2004).
" Kenneth Anderson, Firstin thefield: The uniquemission and legitimacy of the Red Cross
in a culture of legality, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (London), July 31, 1998, No. 4974, citing
to John Keegan, TIMES LrrERARY SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 24, 1995.
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latter intervention counts against the norm-based view of international law
because it is not finally about norms of law, but instead norms of morality,
honor, status, and standing. The laws of war, qua law, are a useful template
for the organization,the Restatement as it were, of the duties of professional
soldiers; the codification is useful in order plainly to set them out. But let us
not confuse the fact of codification with what supplies the motivation for
adherence to them, the tug toward compliance, which is ultimately not law but
professional honor. That is not a motivation of law, but one which merely
happens to coincide with it.
14.
INTENTION AND MOTIVATION

The ambiguities in the case of the laws of war undermine it as a
counterexample to the Goldsmith-Posner thesis; it might be an example of the
tug of international law upon states, or it might not. But the case does serve
another purpose, however, which is to raise the peculiar nature of the
argumentation, at the most abstract, philosophical level, between the theory of
the "tug" of international law as a motivation and ground for intentional action,
and the skepticism of The Limits ofInternationalLaw toward the view that any
such motivation or intention exists.
This observation is, I find, particularly hard to articulate, and it may simply
serve to say that it is incoherent or not very important. Nevertheless, I am
surely not the first person to feel, reading The Limits of InternationalLaw and
listening to the criticism surrounding it, that the debate in some fashion
recapitulates a much more general argument over intention and behaviorist
skepticism about intention, not in legal or moral philosophy, but in philosophy
of mind. It is, of course, why I have used the metaphor of the ghost in the
machine in these remarks; there is something in all this that has caused me to
take down from the shelf, after many years, Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of
Mind and Elizabeth Anscombe' s Intention.45 They are each classic texts, from
the high flowering of English analytic philosophy, intensely concerned with
making sense of what it means to have an intention or to act intentionally, to
have a motive or to act from a motive.46

45 GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPTOFMIND (1949); G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 2 (Comell

University Press 1963) (1957).
' I could have picked, to be sure, a different philosophical literature in the philosophy of
mind-from Continental philosophy and German idealism, for example. The rumination would
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Reading the discussion in the traditional international law literature about
the independent "pull" or "tug" of international law, on account of this
motivation or that, whether internalization of norms or legitimacy or what have
you, leading to acting from a certain intention-well, it brings to mind, despite
the conceptual leap from individuals and their minds to states and international
institutions reified as such, arguments over the mind-body problem, examined
by Ryle, and the problem of the internal account of intention and behavioral
skepticism about it, examined by Anscombe. Likewise, the skeptical account
in The Limits of InternationalLaw has a certain behaviorist feel to it; it
demands a look at the surface of the behavior of states rather than enquiring
into the intentions and motivations behind it.
I understand that I have pushed the analogies already more than they can
bear. My point is not to uncover some close correlation, but instead to suggest
that they stand as a parable-a sort of intellectual warning. If there is anything
to the thought that this argument between traditional international law (seeking
to confirm the "internal" motivations of international law as an independent
force within and upon states) and The Limits of InternationalLaw (expressing
something akin to a behaviorist "external" skepticism about mysterious
internal motivations, intentions, and pulls and tugs and independent weight)
has an antecedent in the philosophy of mind, this is not actually a good thing
for believing that our debate, the debate over international law methodology,
is well-framed. If there is a recapitulation of argument that draws its
problematic from so abstract a set of issues in the concepts of intention,
motivation and so on, this suggests that the terms of debate over international
law method are themselves misconceived.47 We cannot hope to settle the high
level conceptual debate over motivation and intention. If, therefore, the
conceptual questions of motivation and intention have something deeply to do
with our (comparatively) practical argument over international law
methodology, we are likely to bicker endlessly over practicalities, not
recognizing that the root of the problem lies at a level of generality that is not

have been different, but not so very much, and the starting point, described above, would have
been exactly the same. It is also worth noting that at least part of this literature from the
philosophy of mind has worked its way into ethics and from there into legal philosophy.
Anscombe's notion, for example, of what it means to "act under a description," in Intention, was
drawn by ethicists influenced by Wittgensteinean bent, such as Philippa Foot, into the literature
of analytic ethics and then picked up by jurisprudentialists, such as Lloyd Weinreb, giving
accounts of responsibility for actions. ANSCOMBE, supra note 45.
41 If this sounds like a Wittgensteinean form of argument, well, yes. If it sounds like sheer
obscurantism, well, it is probably that, too.
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susceptible to resolution by any method of international law. Deep questions
of motivation and intention are not what international law methods are ever
about resolving.
15.

A FORMALLY EMPTY VESSEL
In order to make the case simultaneously against norm-based international
law and liberal internationalism, The Limits of InternationalLaw must show
that states, rather than acting from motivations of compliance with
international law for its own sake, in fact act based on interest. In order to
make that argument, The Limits of InternationalLaw makes two crucial moves.
The first is to say that states act based on interest, where "interest" means
anything that a state's leadership chooses to put there. It is an empty vessel
that can be filled by anything from "material interest" to "moral values."
Interest is deliberately left open as a substantive matter, to be given meaning
according to a political process ending with a state's political leadership.
This move is necessary in order to deal with what would otherwise be an
extremely awkward, possibly fatal, objection to the theory of The Limits of
InternationalLaw. It is simply that if "interest" were not defined broadly
enough to encompass values, the theory would be open to the retort that it is
altogether evident that many states, liberal democratic ones in particular, do
indeed act from values that often appear to include the values promoted
apparently independent adherence to international law. Such an objection
would be hard to dispute, although it would make for a "harder" theory if The
Limits of InternationalLaw sought to argue that states act from interest in
some traditional, "tough" sense, such as "material interest." One could perhaps
make that "tough," "material interest" argument-but only by defining
"material" to include very indirect things such as long term strategic
advantage, goodwill, and so on.
The Limits of InternationalLaw instead defines interest so as to wrap
values-whatever values the leadership of a state opts to pursue-into the
definition of interests. Thus stated, the theory is now formally sound-but
substantively empty. It can now reach, by simply expanding the definition of
interest to include any value, all the results that could be reached if one
assumes that norm-based international law theory were correct. One cannot
distinguish The Limits of InternationalLaw rational choice theory from normbased theories on the basis of results alone. So long as altruism and other
regarding behavior are accepted as values that can be incorporated into the
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theory of state interest without limitation, there is no necessary clash between
the results achieved by The Limits of InternationalLaw and traditional normbased approaches. The Goldsmith and Posner thesis becomes, in other words,
The Limits of InternationalLaw, without limits and therefore without content.
16.
THE FORMALLY EMPTY VESSEL, FILLED

In order for the Goldsmith and Posner theory to have content, therefore, it
requires some limit on the meaning of state interest and, in particular, the range
of values that can be incorporated into it. This is the second crucial move of
The Limits of InternationalLaw. The authors introduce the limit required to
give the theory content in the form of an empirical assertion about the limits
of other-regarding behavior that state interest is willing to accommodate.48
They argue against what The Limits of International Law calls
"cosmopolitanism." They claim that there are in fact limits on how far a state,
democratic or otherwise, will go for those beyond its political community. It
is a claim that other-regarding international behavior has limits-variable, to
be sure, but a fact of international life whether one attributes the limit to
individuals within a state or to the state itself.
How does this limit on transborder altruism serve as a limit on interest so
as to prevent the Goldsmith-Posner thesis from being empty? It makes the
Goldsmith-Posner thesis meaningful because it will now generate results that
are significantly different-more constrained-than either the method of
norm-based international law or the substantive requirements of liberal
internationalism. If states have limits upon how other-regarding they will be,
and if those limits are more constraining than would be asserted by traditional
norm-based methods relying on the independent weight of international law to
draw states (or at least some important states) beyond those limits, then state
interest, even though able to accommodate values, will still be more
constrained in terms of what states will do than liberal internationalism would
seek it to be or norm-based international law would claim it is.
I have put this more grandiosely than the proposition really is, however.
Goldsmith and Posner treat cosmopolitanism as a potential objection to their
theory. They respond that transborder other-regarding behavior is in fact more
limited than even "plausible cosmopolitanism" says it is, and is likely to
" Arguably, there are several ways in which the limit is introduced. I confine myself to the
most important or, at least, the most provocative.
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remain that way; hence it does not present a successful objection to their
theory. I make the same point the other way around. If the cosmopolitan
other-regarding impulse is indeed limited as Goldsmith and Posner say it is, the
consequence is that state interest expresses a narrower range of interests and
values than would be the case under liberal internationalism reached by a
norm-based method. If that is the case, then there is a discernible difference
between the outcomes of the two methods of approaching international law.
And there is likewise a new discernible difference between the substance of
liberal internationalism and democratic sovereignty. Showing the limited
reach of cosmopolitanism is, in other words, a crucial step in showing that
rationalism "forces" democratic sovereignty-revisionist politics-and that
democratic sovereignty is not simply empty, reflecting an unconstrained range
of values. It is a crucial step in arguing, contrary to Hathaway and Lavinbuk,
that democratic sovereignty is the last man standing.49
Even if that is the strategic situation, however, are Goldsmith and Posner
right concerning cosmopolitan duty? I think they are, and that they are
especially right about the clash between cosmopolitan duty and the internal
demands of democratic practice within a state. That said, it is curious to me
that the discussion of cosmopolitan duty in the book begins from issues of
welfare, distribution, and other-regarding obligations. The question of
cosmopolitanism, it seems to me, necessarily-and for the purposes to which
they put it-starts in a quite different place, which is the question of
membership, membership in a political community."0 Only after that does it
reach questions of distribution and welfare.
'9 Not the only step, of course, as already noted. For example, the game theory must also
work out according to plan. For an important argument that it does not, see David Sloss, Do
InternationalNorms Influence Stale Behavior?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 159 (2006)
(reviewing JACKL. GOLDsMrrH&ERicA. POSNER, THE LIMiTS OFINTERNATIONALLAw (2005)).
'0 My usual starting place on the question of cosmopolitanism in the contemporary world
is FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM (Martha C. Nussbaum &
Joshua Cohen eds., 1996), and MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF

PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1984). Both of these tend to emphasize the primacy of the issue of
membership before reaching questions ofdistribution. The question of the origins of the concept
of cosmopolitanism is addressed by STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOuLS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF
MODERNITY 67-69 (1990). The philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah has recently introduced
an exciting new possibility in cosmopolitan theory, what he calls the "New Cosmopolitanism"
of "mixture," "contamination," and individualism. He has set it out in a provocative essay,
Toward a New Cosmopolitanism,N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 1, 2006, at 30. I do not address that
possibility here, preferring to see the full case when Appiah's book on the subject appears later
in 2006. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETICS INAWORLDOFSTRANGERS
(2006).
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17.
LA RENDICION DE BREDA

I have only one final remark to add. We move from the inside of the book
to the outside. Two years ago, I spent a sabbatical in Spain, and was privileged
to visit the Museo del Prado, where I spent much time looking at the painting
that adorns the cover of The Limits of InternationalLaw, Diego Veldzquez'
justly famed La rendici6nde Breda.
The Dutch town of Breda's surrender to the Spanish took place in 1625-in
other words, several decades before the Treaty of Westphalia around which,
at least by implication, so much of the preceding discussion has taken place.
Breda was finally ceded back to the Netherlands in the Westphalian settlement
of 1648. The surrender of Breda to the Spanish commander, Ambrosio de
Spinola, marques de los balbases,is marked in Velzquez' intensely narrative
painting by the transfer of the key to the city from the Dutch citizens to the
Spanish military commander. As the conventions of siege typically permitted
the sack of a resisting city, this act marks a magnanimity of spirit otherwise
almost wholly missing from the Thirty Years War.5' Spinola's kindly
expression, the arm on the shoulder of the Dutch emissary, and yet the picket
fence of lances in the background-the famous Spanish lances raised to the
sky in a gesture of power restrainedbut not absent-all this represents what
was to be the best face of Westphalia two decades on. It is realism in service
to idealism, power in service to decency.
I have not criticized The Limits of InternationalLaw in these remarks;
mostly I have defended it against the critiques of others. It therefore seems
fitting to close these remarks with a criticism of the book. It is a serious one.
La rendici6n de Breda finds human complexity etched into every one of the
many faces, the postures of the personages, all of the clothing and
accouterments of war and peace of the participants. It is that attentiveness to
the complexity of human affairs that caused me to spend so much time
contemplating the painting in the Prado.
I find it therefore curious that a painting which invests so much human
complexity in the affairs of state and the affairs of men and women should
adorn the cover of a book which, despite the promise of its rational method,
despite its many analytic virtues, and despite what it promises in the way of

"' They had not changed, in fact, very much from the rules applicable in Shakespeare's day,
analyzed with extraordinary care by international humanitarian scholar, Theodor Meron in his
BLOODY CONSTRAINT (2000).
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realist-rational analysis in support of the program of an idealist like me, is in
fact so relentlessly reductive. The reductivism seems to me wrong-headed.
Not precisely wrong, but wrong if seen as anything other than the beginning
of something vastly more complex and more subtle. Truer art for the cover of
The Limits of InternationalLaw would be not the painting in all its glorious
complexity, its nuances and subtlety, but rather one of Veldzquez' initial
sketches preparatory to the final painting, in pencil, not filled in.
I do not mean merely that the game theory and rational choice methodology
that enlivens this book will inevitably become more complex over time. Of
course that will be the case. I mean, rather, precisely what I take Don Diego
Rodriguez de Silva de Veldzquez to have meant-that human complexity,
social complexity, the texture of living people and their politics can be
informed, but not finally captured, by pure rationalism.

